Why Don't They Demand More? Entitlement and Work Values of Religious and Secular Women and Men in Israel

DAHLIA MOORE, PH.D.[1]
Department of Behavioral Sciences
College of Management
and
School of Social Work
The Hebrew University

For decades researchers have shown that women earn less than men; the wages they feel entitled to are lower than men's; and they are as satisfied as men with their salaries even though they earn less. These studies show that complacency regarding wages is more prevalent among tradition-oriented women than among "modern" women. The tendency is related to "traditional" women's work behavior: Tradition-oriented and religious women turn to low status, female-typed occupations, and prefer to work in part-time jobs. They also believe that working women are worse mothers and spouses than non-working women, but they report high work satisfaction. Secular women, on the other hand, believe they should get equal wages when working in the same occupations as men, and they are less satisfied with their pay than religious women, even though they earn more. The findings are explained in terms of Expectations States and Status Value theories.

For more than two decades, researchers throughout the world have been analyzing the gender wage gap.[2] They all show that in the societies they analyze, women earn between 60% and 80% of men's earnings. Despite the many and diverse attempts to explain the wage gap, much of the difference between men's and women's earnings cannot be explained by investments in human capital, occupational sex segregation, job- and industry-related

[1]Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dahlia Moore, School of Social Work, The Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, 91905, Israel. E-mail: dmoore@colman.ac.il

[2]For example Bhatnagar and Rajadhyaksha (2001) in India; Brainerd (2000) in the Former Soviet Union; Di Tomaso (1999) in Italy; Drolet (2002) in Canada; Domanski (2002) in Poland; Crosby (1982), Bielby (1992), and Heckert et al. (2002) in the US; Heywood and Jirjahn (2002) in Germany; Kulik and Rayyan (2003), and Moore (1991) in Israel; Nakata and Takehiro (2002) in Japan; and Pocock and Alexander (1999) in Australia.

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factors, discrimination, family responsibilities or differences in traits (Cappelli, Constantine, & Chadwick, 2000; Moore & Gobi, 1995). Many of these studies also show that women are aware of the fact that they earn less than men but still report lower levels of pay entitlement (Moore, 1991, 1992), and they do not report stronger feelings of dissatisfaction because of their lower pay (Crosby, 1982; Crosby & Ropp, 2002).

On the basis of previous research that analyzed the impact of traditional ideologies on occupational choice that leads to wage differentials (Baunach & Barnes, 2003), this research focuses on two related issues: (1) Do Israeli women today earn as much as men and do they feel entitled to the same wages as men (which is the focus of Study 1)? And (2) If not—do women's preferences, attitudes, and traditional ideologies contribute to their lower wages and to their pay satisfaction (which is the focus of Study 2)?

Theoretical Background

The Wage Gaps

Women still earn less than men in many countries. In Israel, for example, women earn about 70% of men's earnings. This difference is due in part to the number of hours that men and women work (Israeli women worked 35.4 hours a week in 2002 while men worked 42.7 hours); but a wage gap remains even when hourly wages are compared: Women earn per hour 78% of men's earnings (Israeli Bureau of Statistics, 2002).

Several theories were raised to explain the gendered wage gaps, and they represent several themes: human capital, labor market segmentation, sex segregation, and discrimination. Most of them agree that even when productivity-related characteristics (like age, education, training, work-experience, number of hours, and other investments) are controlled, some unexplained wage gap remains. The residual is attributed to different factors (or causes) according to diverse theories. It should be noted that the unexplained wage gap does not, by itself, prove the existence of discrimination (England, 2000; McCall, 2000).

The human capital approach claims that women earn less than men because they invest less in factors that increase productivity such as education, training, and seniority. Recent studies of discrimination show that this is not entirely accurate (Budig & England, 2001; Drolet, 2002; Flynn, 2003). Women do not invest less; they invest in different productivity-increasing characteristics: Women invest more in attaining general human capital (e.g., higher education), while men accumulate job-specific human

capital (e.g., on-the-job training). The returns for the former are usually lower than for the latter (Warren, Rowlingson, & Whyley, 2001).

According to other theories, like sex segregation and discrimination, different investments cannot explain the entire wage gap. These approaches show that rates of return on investments were found to be different for the two gender groups: Men get higher rates of return than women for the same investments (England, 2000). Hence, wage differentials are created by the concurrent influence of two vectors. First, men's productivity-related characteristics are different from women's. Second, men's work is still valued more than women's work, even when they are employed in the same type of occupation (Moore, 1992). Furthermore, women's starting salaries are lower than men's so that even getting higher returns would not raise them to men's average wages (Taniguchi & Rosenfeld, 2002). The disadvantage, according to sex segregation approach (e.g., Gregg, 2000), is more salient for women in female-typed occupations, but it applies to the women in male-typed occupations as well, indicating unequal treatment within occupational categories. They also tend to apply equality as the main justice principle when evaluating their rewards rather than equity, as men tend to do. Their comparisons are mostly with others in the same occupation, and most women work in female-typed occupations, where women are the majority of workers (Heckert et al., 2002), and this tendency reduces their pay entitlement and prevents feelings of relative deprivation even further (Moore, 1991).

The discrimination approach claims that women in female-typed occupations are limited in their employment opportunities, so that they suffer a "double disadvantage": Their human capital and demographic characteristics restrict their choice of occupations, labor market segments and work organizations so that they lack opportunities to improve their lower rewards (England, 2000). In Israel for example, the employment of most women and workers in female-typed occupations is limited to the public sector, as services like health and education are mostly in the hands of government, which is also the biggest employer of secretaries and clerks.

This, according to labor market segmentation approaches (e.g., Deere & Welch, 2002), coupled with this sectors' paying lower average wages because of lower resources and/or the tendency to utilize "alternative compensations," heightens these workers' perceptions of their inferior status in the labor market. This may account, at least in part, for "overcrowding" in the female-typed occupations and explain why overcrowding affects women's wages much more than it affects those of men. Still, in most studies, these factors cannot explain the *entire* gap, and it is clear that other factors are involved. This study assumes that traditional gender role ideology may contribute to the gendered wage gap, because it influences—even shapes—

perception of self and the beliefs concerning just rewards (Berger et al., 1972; Lerner, 1981).

Gender Role Ideology

In most societies, but especially in the more traditional ones, family and domestic obligations are still considered primarily women's responsibilities, while work and breadwinning are considered primarily men's responsibilities, despite the new legitimacy for women's work (Brainerd, 2000; Dancer & Gilbert, 1993; Izraeli, 1990; Moore, 2000). Women who strongly support the traditional gendered division of labor tend to have heavier family responsibilities than women who do not support that division (i.e., the former get married more, and have more children than the latter. They also refrain from working when pregnant and/or when their children are young) (Budig & England, 2001).

Because many women consider their domestic roles as more important than their work roles (especially tradition-oriented women), most of them show limited labor market involvement, they turn to female-typed occupations in which flexible, part-time jobs are more acceptable, and skills do not devalue as fast as in male-typed occupations (Aiba & Wharton, 2001). When they *do* turn to male-typed jobs, they enter the less demanding occupations within them in order to minimize home-work role conflict (Cappelli et al., 2000).

However, the home-work dichotomization seems to be weakening in the less tradition-oriented, more libertarian and egalitarian societies where people have a wider variety of traits, roles, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors to choose from (Jacobs & Gerson, 2001). This flexibility of choice can be seen in changes both in the domestic and the work spheres (e.g., more women enter male-typed occupations, and full-time careers, and men seem to contribute more to the domestic sphere than in the past (Adler, 2002; Williams, 2000).

Researchers show that gender-role attitudes have also changed in the past decade, especially among working women. Consequently, women espouse egalitarian gender attitudes today more than in the past,[3] and the change is more noticeable among women than among men (Crosby & Ropp, 2002). In addition, the studies show that working women are more egalitarian than nonworking women (McCall, 2000). The evidence regarding

[3]Egalitarian attitudes mean "accepting of both women exhibiting traditional male role behaviors and men exhibiting female role behaviors. Therefore, an egalitarian individual would not be prone to gender bias, whether the attitude object is male or female." (King et al., 1994, p. 340).

changes in men's gender-role attitudes and their participation in domestic responsibilities is less clear, and often contradictory (Netz & Haveman, 1999; Noonan, 2001).

The tendency to accept the traditional division of labor may be associated with orthodox religious beliefs, which accord different roles to men and women. Moore (2000) shows that orthodox Jewish women tend to support libertarian, egalitarian ideologies *less* than secular and nontraditional women[4] (see also Greenstein, 1986; Kaufman, 1994). In addition, acceptance of the traditional division of labor is associated with agreement with the stereotypes against working women and the devaluation of their work investments, especially against women who are mothers and wives (e.g., "Working women are worse mothers than nonworking women") (Antecol, 2001; Pelham, Hetts, & Stratton, 2001).

Pay-Entitlement and the Role of Expectations

Why would adherence to traditional gender role ideologies lead to lower wages and lower pay entitlement for women? Expectations State Theory (Berger et al., 1972, 1985) provides a possible explanation by showing that traditional gender ideologies strengthen the tendency to see gender as a status characteristic, and that, in turn, lowers women's wage expectations and entitlement (Gasser, Flint, & Tan, 2000).

The basic premise of status value theory (Berger, Wagner, & Zelditch, 1985) asserts that the distributions of status and influence in groups are determined by initial differences in external status (e.g., sex, race, age). High-status persons are assumed to be more competent (in the absence of contradictory information). These persons are given more opportunities to participate in group activity and influence the group's actions (Fisek, Berger, & Moore, 2002). As a result, they receive more reinforcing reactions and higher rewards which then increase their in-group status (Berger et al., 1972).

The theory posits that gender is a primary external status characteristic according to which being male accords higher status than being female. Therefore, women are usually assigned lower positions than men in task-oriented groups (Gasser, Flint, & Tan, 2000), and men are given more opportunities than women to contribute to the groups' activity (Berger, 1992).

[4]In contrast, some Christian denominations as well as Reform and Conservative Judaism are more liberal, and more egalitarian. However, these denominations are not common in Israel and only orthodox Judaism is currently formally recognized so that only orthodox rabbis determine who is Jewish, perform marriage ceremonies, etc. The more egalitarian denominations are strongly influenced by liberal, humanitarian, and feminist movements around them.

Consequently, men receive more positive reinforcements than women. This leads them, as it does all individuals who belong to high status groups, to develop higher expectations (Ridgeway, 1997).

Moreover, women who internalize the lower status and expectations attributed to them will tend to accept—and expect—these lower positions (Hegtvedt, Thompson, & Cook, 1993). The cognition that gender is a fundamental characteristic will tend, therefore, to lower women's probability of success in the public sphere beyond specific groups (like the work domain) in comparison with men's (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003).

As a result, gender is one of the major factors that influences the process by which people form future expectations and pay-entitlement, and can explain women's basic acceptance of lower rewards as normative, and their tendency to express greater satisfaction with their wages, though their wages are usually lower than men's (Crosby et al., 1986).

This study assumes that the tendency to accept gender as a status characteristic will be more noticeable among tradition-oriented individuals than among non-traditional ones. This assumption is based on previous research, which has demonstrated that tradition-oriented individuals tend to be more conforming and authoritarian than liberal and non-traditional individuals (Rubinstein, 1995; Unger & Safir, 1994).

Thus, women who accept the traditional division of labor will have even lower performance expectations, will value their work contributions less than those of men, and will expect (or feel entitled to) lower wages than liberal women because of their traditional values and their greater emphasis on domestic roles. This will be strengthened by employers' reactions to religiosity as a status construction cue (Ridgeway & Balkwell, 1997),[5] and their lower expectations regarding these women. Though it was not examined directly in the past, we assume that women's adherence to the traditional division of labor may explain their tendencies to express greater satisfaction with their wages than do liberal women who do not accept this division.

To examine these issues, two data sets were used. The first compares religious and secular men and women and focuses on wages and their perceptions: how much they feel entitled to get, what factors are related to wages and pay-entitlement, and what justice principles men and women apply when they consider their current wages. The second study compares religious and secular women and focuses on pay satisfaction, on how family and work characteristics are related to their wages and satisfaction, and on how

[5]Unlike Christian women or Jewish women in the United States and Europe, religious women in Israel are highly distinct from secular women (and so are their exact religious affiliations) by their codes of dress. It seems that in Israel it serves as a status cue as much as gender or skin color.

religious and gendered attitudes contribute to the differences between them. The variables were derived from and represent the theories mentioned earlier.

Study 1

Official publications and the mass media in Israel report data regarding the lower wages received by women. Hence, in contrast with the past, most women are now aware that they earn about 70% of men's earnings. This study examines whether that knowledge has increased women's entitlement and whether despite changes in attitudes toward working women reported in recent years (Moore, 2000), women evaluate their work investments by different criteria than men. Thus:

> *H1*: The wages and pay-entitlement reported by women are lower than men's, and the wages and pay-entitlement of religious women are lower than those of secular women.
>
> *H2*: Men's wage-entitlement is more strongly related to human capital factors (like education, working hours, and experience (represented by age)) than women's wage-entitlement. In contrast, women's wage-entitlement is influenced more strongly by their perceptions and attitudes (i.e., traditional values, the justice principles they apply, and relative deprivation).

Sample

A national probability sample of the Jewish (N = 450) and Arab (N = 160) population in Israel was drawn in 2001. Data for the study were collected by Dahaf Institute for Social Research, as part of a larger research on attitudinal differences between Jews and Arabs. To make it comparable to the sample in Study 2, the analyses in this study are based only on the Jewish subsample. The respondents' ages range from 21-70. Data were collected by telephone interviews conducted at the respondents' homes. Incomplete questionnaires (2%) and refusals to respond (30%) were excluded from further analysis, and replaced by others. The proportions of gender, ethnic origin, and geographic location categories in the sample correspond to those of the entire population in 2000, as reported by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2000).

Variables and Measures

Religiosity—The question had 4 response categories: Orthodox, Religious, Traditional, and Secular. The first three categories were combined in

accord with the study's assumptions, so that Orthodox, Religious, and tradition-oriented = 1; Secular = 0. Among men 34% are in the combined "religious" category, among women, 36%.[6] This dichotomy is often used in Israel. Previous studies show that it represents the main difference in Israeli society, creating its most salient chasm (Rubinstein, 1995; Unger & Safir, 1994).

Wages and Their Evaluations

Wages—Gross Monthly earnings. Range 2,500-25,000 NIS.

Entitlement—Continuous. In comparison to the wages of other people you know, how much do you think a person in your job should get? Range: 2,000-40,000 NIS.

Sufficient Income—Continuous. Open question—How much income will be sufficient for your family needs? Range: 2,000-40,000 NIS.

Values and Orientations

Justice Principle—The question asked: There are diverse perceptions of justice when determining workers' wages. Which of the following perceptions seems to you the most just? (1) To have collective wage-agreements for each occupation so that all individuals who do the same work will get the same pay. (2) To have personal wage-agreements based on worker's efficiency, so that those who are better workers will get higher wages. (3) That people's wages will include need considerations so that those who have bigger families will get higher pay. Two dummy variables were created: **Justice-Equity**—Those who chose response (2) were coded 1 (else = 0); and **Justice-Needs**—Those who chose response (3) were coded 1 (else = 0). Responses to (1) which represent equality are the omitted category.

Perceived Deprivation—The question asked: Do you sometimes feel that you are deprived at work in comparison with other workers? The item was

[6]Comparing the three categories that were later combined shows that the differences in attitudes of these groups are not statistically significant in most cases.

measured on a 9-point Likert scale with 1 = feel deprived very rarely and 9 = feel deprived very often.

Demographic Variables

Working hours (continuous); **age** (continuous); **Education** (continuous, Number of years of formal education); **Family size** (continuous); **Ethnic origin**—Two dummy variables were created: Asian (either Respondent or Respondent's father is of Asia-African descent = 1; else = 0) and Western (either Respondent or Respondent's father is European = 1; else = 0). Second Generation Israeli-born is the omitted category.

Findings

Are There Gender and Religiosity Differences in Wages and Entitlement?

To examine H1, according to which significant gender and religiosity differences are to be expected, all the variables were compared. Significant gender differences exist in only three of the variables: Entitlement (women report lower entitlement than men ($F = 10.21$, $p \leq .01$)), wages (women earn less than men ($F = 27.06$, $p \leq .01$)), and working hours (women work fewer hours than men ($F = 29.81$, $p \leq .01$)) (see Table 1). Thus, women still earn less than men, but they do not feel entitled to as much as men are getting, even though they apply the same justice principles as men do. Also, they do not feel more deprived than men.

Differences between religious and seculars exist in wages and almost all the other variables: Religious individuals earn less than seculars, they choose needs as their main justice principle more than seculars and support equity less, they have bigger families, lower education, and more among them are of Asian origin, whereas the seculars are of European origin or second-generation Israeli-born. Examination of the gender X religiosity interactions shows that the only significant interactions are those dealing with justice principles showing that religious women choose needs more than all other groups, and they reject the equity principle more than all other groups.

Existing wages of the 4 groups are lower than what they consider sufficient income. However, because the sufficient incomes of the 4 groups are similar, and their wages are not, the gap between wages and sufficient income is much larger for women than for men. Women earn about half of what they see as sufficient income, whereas men earn almost all that they need. This may contribute to women's belief that their salary is but a

Table 1

*Analysis of Variance: Comparing Secular and Religious Men and Women**

	Women		Men				
Variable	Secular N = 187	Religious N = 99	Secular N = 136	Religious N = 78	F Gender	F Religiosity	F Interaction
Entitlement	9545.26	9302.08	13229.27	10670.21	10.208[a]	2.096	1.511
	(6896.34)	(6623.41)	(8642.37)	(6747.20)			
Sufficient income	12311.76	10529.76	11354.26	11150.68	.402	2.502	1.358
	(7573.88)	(4939.61)	(7041.78)	(6525.42)			
Wages	6383.33	5479.59	9946.67	8250.00	27.056[a]	3.729[b]	.362
	(4599.74)	(3180.27)	(6266.37)	(5168.21)			
Working hours	37.54	35.35	45.91	45.56	29.807[a]	.581	.284
	(12.171)	(11.077)	(17.65)	(12.89)			
Age	44.49	42.03	42.96	42.56	.269	.902	.389
	(16.21)	(16.10)	(19.14)	(17.36)			
Education	14.68	13.40	14.40	13.96	.005	8.630[a]	1.742
	(3.42)	(3.07)	(3.12)	(3.47)			
Family size	3.28	4.28	3.02	4.48	.310	44.629[a]	1.619
	(1.68)	(2.34)	(1.41)	(2.43)			
Justice-Needs	.11	.29	.11	.15	1.966	11.561[a]	3.741[b]
	(.31)	(.44)	(.31)	(.34)			

Table 1. Continued

Variable	Women		Men		F Gender	F Religiosity	F Interaction
	Secular N = 187	Religious N = 99	Secular N = 136	Religious N = 78			
Justice-Equity	.77	.52	.71	.69	.416	10.718[a]	6.356[a]
	(.43)	(.50)	(.45)	(.46)			
Deprivation	3.42	3.37	2.85	3.16	2.977	.172	.444
	(2.85)	(2.93)	(2.62)	(2.68)			
Ethnicity-Asian	.19	.53	.18	.47	.272	60.726[a]	.351
	(.39)	(.50)	(.39)	(.50)			
Ethnicity-European	.35	.22	.34	.24	1.346	11.824[a]	.248
	(.48)	(.41)	(.49)	(.43)			

*Numbers in Parentheses are standard deviations.
[a]$p \leq .01$.
[b]$p \leq .05$.

supplementary income, and to men's attribution of importance to their breadwinner role.

Which Criteria Are the Wages and Entitlement of Men and Women Related To?

The analysis seems to indicate that religious women are "doubly disadvantaged," in support of H2: They earn less both because they are women and because they are religious. In order to examine whether the impact of religiosity on wages remains significant when other factors are taken into account, regressions analyses were conducted.

The regression analyses were conducted separately for men and women, and in accord with H2 they predict men's wages better than women's ($R^2 = .378$ and $R^2 = .272$, respectively). Religiosity affects only the wages of men, not those of women so that religious men earn 1,971 NIS less than secular men ($t = -2.01$, $p = .052$). The difference between religious and secular women is much smaller, and not statistically significant (other things being equal, religious women earn 63.5 NIS less than secular women, $t = -.09$, $p = .93$) (see Table 2). The difference in the impact of religion on the wages of men and women is statistically significant, as are the differences among all other characteristics (see last column in Table 2). The analysis also shows that men's returns are higher then women's, so for example, women not only work fewer hours than men as Table 1 shows, they also earn less per hour than men.

Examination of entitlement shows that in accord with H2, the equation explains men's entitlement better than women's ($R^2 = .625$ and $R^2 = .473$, respectively). However, religiosity is not significantly related to entitlement (See Table 3, equations 1 & 4). Family and work characteristics like education, working hours, and feelings of deprivation contribute to the prediction of entitlement levels of both men and women (see Table 3, equations 2 & 5). For men, age too is a significant factor. Thus, entitlement is based on "legitimate" (i.e., meritocratic) work contributions: better educated individuals and those who work longer hours feel entitled to higher pay.

These influences vanish or weaken when actual wages are introduced into the equation (see Table 3 equations, 3 & 6). As could be expected, income has the strongest influence on entitlement, and the impact is significantly stronger for women than for men. As claimed by Moore (1991, 1992), existing wages seem to serve as a yardstick by which individuals evaluate their contributions and form expectations. Also, women's lower wages curb their pay-entitlement more strongly than men's wages, and may explain why they expect to earn less. In addition, as women's returns on their investments are

Table 2

Study 1: Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Wages

	Women						Men						Comparison t Values*	
	Equation 1			Equation 2			Equation 1			Equation 2			Equation 1	Equation 2
Variables	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t		
Religiosity	-881.40	-.104	-1.22	63.47	.01	.09	-1682.84	-.138	-1.493	-1971.47	-.17	-2.01[b]	8.63	23.34
Working hours				356.25	.31	3.98[a]				710.06	.41	5.15[a]		22.73
Age				106.88	.34	4.41[a]				174.79	.46	6.02[a]		15.08
Education				-200.40	-.02	-.27				-965.19	-.08	-.88		37.11
Family size				-786.88	-.09	-1.00				1167.40	.09	.99		3.62
Justice–needs				356.25	.31	3.98[a]				710.06	.41	5.15[a]		5.59
Justice–equity				83.31	.05	.52				109.59	.04	.50		15.72
Deprivation				24.99	.10	1.20				57.90	.18	2.16[b]		13.36
Asian origin				63.47	.01	.09				-1971.47	-.17	-2.01[b]		19.61
European origin				83.31	.05	.52				109.59	.04	.50		8.44
Constant	6139.75		14.61[a]	-3996.84		-1.95[b]	9691.51		14.37[a]	-10711.6		-3.49[a]	23.80	65.71
Adjusted R^2	.011			.257			.019			.375				
F	1.50			6.48[a]			2.23			9.35[a]				

*All comparison t values are significant ($p \leq .01$). Comparison of regression coefficients was based on the test used by Gottfredson (1981), but with corrections for degrees of freedom reflecting unequal sample sizes were added (Hays, 1966).

$$Comparison\ t = \frac{(B_1 - B_2)}{\sqrt{(SE_1^2/n_1 + SE_2^2/n_2)}}$$

[a] $p \leq .01$.
[b] $p \leq .05$.

Table 3

Study 1: Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Pay-Entitlement

	Women									Men									Comparison t Values		
	Equation 1			Equation 2			Equation 3			Equation 1			Equation 2			Equation 3			Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3
	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	T	B	Beta	t			
Religiosity	-236.68	-.017	-.20	1126.88	.08	.93	929.38	.07	.93	-2474.50	-.15	-1.66	-1947.82	-.12	-1.43	-411.74	-.03	-.38	-18.29	-25.38	-19.26
Working hours				88.71	.17	2.14[b]	-14.40	-.03	-.39				152.55	.31	3.97[a]	11.18	.02	.31		16.44	3.62
Age				55.95	.14	1.57	34.01	.08	1.15				85.13	.20	2.42[b]	38.34	.09	1.34		15.65	7.80
Education				598.38	.32	3.85[a]	253.46	.14	1.87				921.81	.41	4.97[a]	380.80	.17	2.34[b]		26.05	2.18
Family size				143.16	.05	.52	77.80	.03	.34				43.69	.01	.15	-51.17	-.02	-.22		-5.69	3.87
Justice–needs				2812.01	.17	1.66	1287.67	.08	.91				-1102.24	-.05	-.55	-910.68	-.04	-.57		-31.61	-35.66
Justice–equity				1122.33	.08	.76	-621.02	-.05	-.50				-389.08	-.02	-.28	145.710	.01	.12		-8.72	2.40
Deprivation				-377.63	-.16	-2.04[b]	-168.63	-.07	-1.09				-514.33	-.19	-2.40[b]	-168.12	-.06	-.96		14.34	19.96
Asian origin				-1681.97	-.12	-1.24	-887.37	-.06	-.79				2067.39	.12	1.33	1324.68	.08	1.07		29.97	21.73
European origin				146.68	.01	.11	656.28	.05	.61				2840.00	.18	1.95[b]	4008.27	.25	3.44[a]		21.55	44.73
Wages							1.00	.61	7.82[a]							.81	.62	7.91[a]			2.38

Table 3. Continued

	Women									Men									Comparison t Values		
	Equation 1			Equation 2			Equation 3			Equation 1			Equation 2			Equation 3			Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3
	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	T	B	Beta	t			
Constant	8932.69		12.86	-5296.31		-1.39	-1144.41		-.358	12221.2		13.73[a]	-10642.7		-2.44[b]	-4196.78		-1.18	88.57	48.76	10.70
Adjusted R^2	.001			.219			.473			.023			.401			.625					
F	.04			3.59[a]			10.36[a]			2.76			7.11[a]			15.89[a]					

*All comparison t values are significant ($p \leq .01$). Comparison of regression coefficients was based on the test used by Gottfredson (1981), but with corrections for degrees of freedom reflecting unequal sample sizes were added (Hays, 1966).

$$Comparison\ t = \frac{(B_1 - B_2)}{\sqrt{(SE_1^2/n_1 + SE_2^2/n_2)}}$$

[a] $p \leq .01$.
[b] $p \leq .05$.

lower then men's, the lower wages serve as an indication that their work-related inputs and contributions are valued less than men's. Consequently, they develop lower self-evaluations, and feel entitled to lower wages, forming a vicious circle that continuously diminishes the evaluations of women's work-related contributions.

Study 2

This study augments Study 1 by focusing and elaborating on the differences between religious and secular women. It examines whether religious women support the traditional gendered division of labor more than secular women and whether this contributes to a double disadvantage in the sense that religious women will receive lower wages not only because they are women, but also because their religiosity serves as a status characteristic cue to employers. Furthermore, it addresses the consequences of the differences in ideologies, beliefs, and attitudes for the pay-satisfaction of religious and secular women. If religious women support the traditional division of labor and the conservative gender ideology more than secular women then:

> *H3*: Religious women express more conformist beliefs and opinions than secular women, and their family responsibilities follow traditional definitions and expectations more closely than those of secular women (H3a), and their labor market involvement is more limited than that of secular women (H3b).
>
> *H4*: Because they are expected to invest less in their jobs than in their families, the work of religious women is valued less than that of nontraditional women. As a result, religiosity and traditional gender ideologies have *direct* negative influences on wages.
>
> *H5*: If religious women indeed accept the lower work-related performance expectations attributed to them, and see lower wages as just, then religious women are more satisfied with their wages although their wages tend to be lower than those of secular women.

Sample

The study analyzes data collected for the Ministry of Labor and Welfare in Israel in 2001, in an attempt to analyze patterns of work and unemploy-

ment of married and single Jewish women. It is based on a representative subsample (N = 2,960) that was drawn from the population of working women aged 20-45 (excluding women in Kibbutzim or in compulsory military service). The original sample (N = 4,130) included non-working women as well.[7] The proportions of age, immigration status, education, and geographic categories in the sample correspond to those of the entire population, as reported by the Israeli Bureau of Statistics (2002). Data were collected by telephone interviews conducted at the respondents' homes. Incomplete questionnaires were excluded from further analysis and refusals to respond were replaced.

Variables and Measures

Religiosity—Orthodox, Religious, and tradition-oriented = 1; Seculars = 0.

Dependant Variables

Wages—Gross monthly earnings, New Israeli Shekels.

Pay-satisfaction The question: "How satisfied are you with each of the following?" Eight items were asked, but in this context, only satisfaction with wages is used. Items were measured on a 6-point Likert scale with 1 = very dissatisfied and 6 = very satisfied.

Work Characteristics

Seniority—Continuous. Number of years in the labor market.

Time in current job—Continuous. Number of months in current job.

Job's S.E.S—Continuous. Based on Andrea Tyree's (1981) index, in which 1 = lowest status and 100 = highest status. The higher the value, the higher the respondent's job status.

Authority—In charge of other workers = 1; not in charge = 0.

Hours of work—Continuous, weekly.

[7]The decision to sample women only derives from the desire to obtain a large enough sample of working women, and from budgetary limitations.

Full/Part-timer—"Regardless of working hours, is your job defined as full- or part-time?" (Full time = 1; part-time = 0).

Time traveling to work—Continuous, minutes.

Family and Related Characteristics

Marital status—Married = 1; Else = 0.

Number of children—Continuous.

Children under 4—Small children (under 4 years old) at home = 1; no small children = 0.

Domestic help—Employs domestic help at least once a week = 1; no domestic help = 0.

Work while pregnant—Worked when pregnant = 1; did not work when pregnant = 0.

Home with child—Stayed home when child was small = 1; other childcare solutions = 0.

Age—Continuous.

Education—Continuous, number of years of formal education.

Ethnic origin—Three categories were defined according to respondents' and respondents' father place of birth: European, Asian-African, and second generation Israeli-born. The latter is the omitted category. Thus two dummy variables were created: Asian (either respondent or her father Asia-African = 1; else = 0) and Western (either respondent or her father European = 1; else = 0).

Gender Role Attitudes

Gender stereotypes—Seven questions regarding gender and work-related stereotypes were asked: Women who do not work are better mothers than working women; Loyalty to the work place is higher among men than among women; Women get most of their satisfaction from family, not from their work; Raising children hinders the professional advancement of

women; Men are the main providers for their families, etc. Answers to each item ranged from 1 = totally disagree to 6 = totally agree. Range: 7-42. The higher the value, the stronger the stereotype. ($\alpha = .72$).

Gendered beliefs—Five questions regarding division of labor were asked only in the sample of younger women (20–25 years old): A woman should choose an occupation in which her knowledge and skills do not deteriorate if she stops working for a few years; For successful family life, the occupational status of a man should be higher than that of his mate; A man should choose an occupation according to his interest, not according to family obligations; If the careers of a couple lead to conflicts of interest, the woman should make concessions; A woman should choose an occupation according to her interest in it, not according to any family considerations (item reversed) ($\alpha = .57$). Answers ranged from 1 = totally disagree to 6 = totally agree. Range: 5-30. The higher the value, the stronger the belief.

Reward Preferences 1—Prefer earnings—Given a choice, which job would you prefer:more interesting with 20% lower pay (= 0) or less interesting with 20% higher pay (= 1).

Preferences 2—Children first—Which option do you consider preferable for young women–have children first, and once they are grown develop occupational career (= 0) or delay having children until they establish their careers (= 1)?

Results and Analysis

Analyses of the data were done in two stages. The objective of the first—descriptive—analysis was to discern whether differences between religious and secular women exist (as H3 posits). The second stage, based on a non-recursive structural equation model (see Figure 1), aims to examine the process by which wages and wage-satisfaction are determined, and whether the same process defines the wages and wage-satisfaction of the two aforementioned categories (as H4 and H5 posit).

Are There Differences between Religious and Secular Women?

Differences between religious and secular women can be seen in all the examined domains. First, religious women earn significantly less than secular women (see Table 4). Despite that, they are significantly more satisfied with their earnings. Differences were found both in the domestic sphere and



Figure 1.

in work characteristics indicating that religious women support the traditional division of labor and the conservative gender ideology more than secular women, as H4 suggested.[8] Religious women get married more than secular women; they have more children, employ domestic help less often, and they tend to stay at home when their children are young more than secular women. They also have lower education than secular women. As the Asian-African ("Mizrachi") ethnic group in Israel tends to be more tradition-observant, it is not surprising to find that the proportion of this ethnic group among religious women is greater than among secular women.[9]

In only one factor in the domestic sphere—working while pregnant—no differences were found between religious and secular women, and in only one factor religious women deviate from the traditional factors—the number of days off when a child was sick: Religious women take fewer days off than secular women. A possible explanation is that religious women have alternative solutions like larger families that can provide help and support.

[8]Although the differences are sometimes small, almost all of them are significant. Their relative importance is revealed in the equations in the forthcoming analyses.

[9]This is in contrast with the method used by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), which asks the origin of respondents' fathers as well as the respondents. Therefore, the proportions are smaller than those reported by CBS. It may also be because the sampled women are relatively young (20-45) and immigration from Asian and African countries dwindled significantly in the past decades. The only exception is the immigration from Ethiopia, but new immigrant Ethiopian women tend not to work outside their homes.

Table 4

*Study 2: Analysis of Variance: Comparing Secular and Religious Women**

Variable	Women		F	R
	Secular (N = 1449)	Religious (N = 1310)		
Dependant Variables				
Earnings (monthly, NIS)	4540.15	3771.09	44.53[a]	.155
	(2709.46)	(2144.13)		
Pay-satisfaction (low = 1; high = 7)	4.22	4.44	6.48[a]	.048
	(2.27)	(2.41)		
Work satisfaction (factor scores)	- .07	.10	17.18[a]	
	(1.01)	(.99)		
Work characteristics				
Seniority (years in the labor force)	10.66	9.95	7.09[a]	.054
	(6.60)	(6.29)		
Time in current job (months)	61.18	68.42	7.28[a]	.055
	(65.14)	(66.89)		
Occupational SES	50.49	48.31	7.43[a]	.055
	(20.27)	(18.50)		
Authority (yes = 1)	.29	.20	22.53[a]	.096
	(.45)	(.41)		
Number of hours (per week)	35.49	31.77	58.80[a]	.156
	(11.73)	(11.97)		
Full/part-time (full-time = 1)	.71	.66	6.73[a]	.053
	(.46)	(.47)		
Travel to work (minutes)	25.99	22.77	14.88[a]	.079
	(21.71)	(18.61)		
Family and related characteristics				
Marital status (married = 1)	.96	.99	11.22[a]	.097
	(.45)	(.38)		
Number of children	2.07	3.10	155.17[a]	.339
	(1.20)	(1.81)		
Children under 4 (has = 1)	.36	.52	9.02[a]	.111
	(.48)	(.50)		

Table 4. Continued

Variable	Women		F	R
	Secular (N = 1449)	Religious (N = 1310)		
Domestic help (at least once a week = 1)	.14 (.43)	.10 (.36)	9.25[a]	.088
Work while pregnant (yes = 1)	2.11 (.68)	2.07 (.67)	2.02[ns]	.032
Home with child (stayed = 1)	.17 (.38)	.22 (.42)	4.70[b]	.063
Education	14.46 (2.58)	13.37 (2.34)	91.18[a]	.210
Age	35.80 (7.35)	33.82 (7.11)	49.81[a]	.156
European origin (yes = 1)	.36 (.47)	.11 (.30)	176.83[a]	.286
Asian-African origin (yes = 1)	.02 (.14)	.05 (.21)	12.53[a]	.079
Attitudinal characteristics				
Gender stereotypes	24.39 (6.64)	27.52 (6.66)	28.75[a]	.222
Gendered beliefs	2.93 (.74)	3.45 (.85)	59.26[a]	.311
High pay > interest	.77 (.42)	.62 (.49)	13.79[a]	.155
Children before career	.88 (.32)	.65 (.48)	43.71[a]	.270

*Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
[a]$p \leq .01$.
[b]$p \leq .05$.

Examination of their work characteristics also supports the claim that religious women maintain more conservative gender ideologies, as H4 suggested: Religious women work fewer hours and more among them are in part-time jobs than secular women, their accumulated number of years in

the labor market and tenure in current jobs are lower, fewer among them are in positions of authority, they are in lower status jobs, and they work closer to home so that the time they spend traveling to work is shorter than that of secular women (see Table 4).

It is not surprising, therefore, that religious women retain negative beliefs and work-related stereotypes more than secular women. They believe that women should choose occupations and jobs that will minimize role conflict and take family considerations and responsibilities into account ("minimizing work role" strategy—see Moore & Gobi, 1995). They seem to think that women should enter jobs in which skills do not deteriorate to enable them to leave work when family obligations necessitate it (e.g., when their children are young or when her work interferes with that of her spouse). They also accept the negative stereotypes against working women according to which they are but secondary providers, and cannot invest in their careers as much as men or risk being poorer mothers and wives. As the question regarding beliefs was only asked in the sample of younger women (20-25 years old) it seems safe to assume that this is true even of the younger women.

Do Religiosity and Traditional Gender Ideology Influence Wages Directly?

To examine the process by which wages are determined, and ascertain the direct impact of religiosity (as H5 claims), the study uses both hierarchical regression analyses and a recursive structural equation model (SEM) for wages and satisfaction. SEM enables multivariate 'causal' analysis in order to test hypotheses concerning structural theories. Structural equation models entail, according to Byrne (1998), two implications. First, that the causal processes under study are represented by a series of structural (i.e., regression) equations.[10] Second, that the structural relations can be presented graphically. The hypothesized model can be tested statistically in a simultaneous analysis of the entire system of variables to determine the extent to which it is consistent with the data.

The hierarchical regression analyses predicting wages show, as hypothesized by H5, a significant relationship between religiosity and wages, regardless of other variables included in the equation, so that in all the models religious women earn less than secular women ($\beta = -.155$) (see Table 5 and Appendix I). In the equation that includes demographic variables (equation 2), the contribution of number of children and marital status is significant. When work characteristics are added (equation 3), marital status looses its

[10]Thus, wages, for example, serve as both a dependent and an independent variable, depending on the hypothesis.

Table 5

Study 2: Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Wages

	Equation 1				Equation 2				Equation 3				Equation 4			
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	B	Std. Error	Beta	t
Religiosity	-763.42	114.53	-.155	-6.67[a]	-613.57	114.01	-.125	-5.38[a]	-242.02	95.83	-.049	-2.55[a]	-216.63	95.60	-.044	-2.27[b]
Children under 4					-224.24	123.13	-.045	-1.82	85.71	106.42	.017	.80	66.26	106.04	.013	.63
Num. of children					188.86	41.56	.121	4.54[a]	74.87	38.56	.048	1.98[b]	86.29	38.49	.055	2.24[b]
Marital status					309.41	156.02	.053	1.98[b]	-56.06	129.85	-.010	-.43	-29.81	129.42	-.005	-.23
Education					322.93	21.71	.333	14.88[a]	254.22	20.13	.262	12.62[a]	249.93	20.07	.258	12.45[a]
Asian origin					928.68	304.06	.067	3.05[a]	522.39	251.77	.038	2.08[b]	525.57	250.64	.038	2.10[b]
Time in job									10.17	.87	.273	11.61[a]	9.91	.87	.266	11.35[a]
Seniority									-7.20	9.56	-.019	-.75	-7.99	9.52	-.021	-.84
SES									21.82	2.55	.172	8.56[a]	21.67	2.54	.171	8.53[a]
Travel to work									7.54	2.16	.063	3.48[a]	7.86	2.16	.065	3.65[a]
Authority									943.66	106.76	.165	8.84[a]	903.10	106.73	.158	8.46[a]
Number of hours									69.89	3.89	.341	17.95[a]	69.09	3.88	.337	17.81[a]
Stereotypes													-27.76	6.68	-.076	-4.16[a]
Constant	4503.92	79.23		56.85[a]	559.40	325.53		1.72	3818.68	318.19		12.01[a]	3014.83	371.16		8.12[a]
Adjusted R^2	.023				.150				.425				.430			
F	44.43				54.16				112.36				105.99			

[a] $p \leq .01$.
[b] $p \leq .05$.

significance, and other variables (like SES, authority, and number of working hours) become significant.

It is interesting to note that gender ideology exerts significant influence on wages (equation 4) even when religiosity, demographic characteristics, and work attributes are taken into account ($\beta = -.076$). Thus, the stronger the acceptance of the gender stereotypes, the lower the wages. This seems to indicate that women who support the traditional division of labor expect lower wages or demand less than less traditional women.[11]

The analyses of the structural equation model support the regression analyses and show that religiosity has a significant effect on wages ($\beta = -.048$), and gender ideology, represented by both stereotypes and beliefs, has even stronger effects ($\beta = -.087$, and $\beta = -.143$, respectively) (see Table 6). The impact of ideology is stronger than that of religiosity, and it is *all* direct influence (the impact of religiosity is partly direct ($\beta = -.020$) and partly indirect ($\beta = -.028$)).[12]

Several factors contribute to the strengthening of gender ideology. In the present study, religiosity, marital status, and education were found significantly related to both stereotypes and beliefs, indicating that religious women support the ideology more strongly than secular women ($\beta_{(stereotypes)} = .099$; $\beta_{(beliefs)} = .269$), married women support it more than those who are not married ($\beta_{(stereotypes)} = .048$; $\beta_{(beliefs)} = .161$), and the less educated support it more than those who are well-educated ($\beta_{(stereotypes)} = -.077$; $\beta_{(beliefs)} = -.287$). Thus, married religious women with lower education support the gender ideology more than single, secular and highly educated women.

Examination of the entire set of influences (see Table 6) shows complex relationships according to which demographic characteristics (like number of children and marital status) influence work attributes (like number of working hours, seniority, and authority), and both influence wages. Mothers (especially of young children) tend to accumulate fewer years in the labor market, work fewer hours, and find employment closer to home more than women who are not mothers (or whose children have grown).[13]

These factors are among the main factors that influence wages. Although a large number of variables were included in the model, and almost all of them contribute significantly to the explaining of wages, we cannot explain *all* the variance in wages. (The hierarchical regression analysis predicting wages revealed adjusted $R^2 = .433$. See Table 5.) This may be due to the Israeli tax system and the tax-reducing "benefit points" a woman has.

[11]Gender beliefs were not included in the equation as the relevant questions were asked only in the questionnaire for younger women (ages 20-25).

[12]Table of division of effects is available from author.

[13]Table of division of effects is available from author.

Table 6

The Model's Coefficients

Regression weights	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	Standardized weights
marital status ← religious	.118	.016	7.546[a]	.140
Children ← religious	.859	.057	15.129[a]	.272
driv_min ← children	-1.415	.258	-5.496[a]	-.109
driv_min ← marital status	1.434	.967	1.483	.029
work hours ← marital status	.528	.563	.938	.018
work hours ← children	-1.026	.150	-6.840[a]	-.135
Seniority ← children	1.583	.070	22.717[a]	.391
Seniority ← marital status	.839	.261	3.210[a]	.055
Seniority ← education	.261	.044	6.005[a]	.104
SES ← marital status	2.477	.778	3.186[a]	.054
SES ← children	-.042	.209	-.203	-.003
SES ← education	3.389	.129	26.207[a]	.445
SES ← driv_min	.003	.017	.150	.003
Stereotypes ← religious	1.327	.259	5.119[a]	.099
Stereotypes ← marital status	.773	.298	2.592[a]	.048
Stereotypes ← education	-.203	.050	-4.061[a]	-.077
Opinions ← religious	1.678	.235	7.141[a]	.269
Opinions ← marital status	1.195	.271	4.414[a]	.161
Opinions ← education	-.353	.045	-7.850[a]	-.287
authority ← children	.003	.006	.588	.012
authority ← marital status	.019	.019	1.000	.019
authority ← education	.022	.003	6.859[a]	.131
authority ← driv_min	.000	.000	.476	.009
authority ← seniority	.007	.001	5.084[a]	.106
authority ← work hours	.007	.001	1.059	.195
wages ← religious	-.044	.022	-1.991[a]	-.048
wages ← marital status	.099	.026	3.859[a]	.085
wages ← driv_min	.001	.000	2.214[a]	.046
wages ← SES	.007	.001	12.109[a]	.256
wages ← seniority	.014	.002	8.816[a]	.182

Table 6. Continued

Regression weights	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	Standardized weights
wages ← stereotypes	-.006	.002	-4.207[a]	-.087
wages ← opinions	-.023	.006	-3.577[a]	-.143
wages ← work hours	.013	.001	15.051[a]	.309
satisfaction ← religious	.097	.049	2.005[a]	.049
satisfaction ← children	.068	.014	4.926[a]	.108
satisfaction ← marital status	.113	.050	2.247[a]	.048
satisfaction ← education	-.026	.010	-2.520[a]	-.065
satisfaction ← seniority	-.008	.003	-2.335[a]	-.051
satisfaction ← driv_min	-.005	.001	-5.596[a]	-.111
satisfaction ← SES	.003	.001	2.355[a]	.054
satisfaction ← work hours	-.000	.002	-.091	-.002
satisfaction ← authority	.281	.046	6.074[a]	.121
satisfaction ← stereotypes	.005	.002	2.075[a]	.098
satisfaction ← opinions	.062	.011	5.755[a]	.191
satisfaction ← wages	.373	.054	6.923[a]	.185

[a] $p \leq .05$.

Therefore, other things being equal, married women and mothers earn more than single women.

What Contributes to the Prediction of Pay-Satisfaction?

Turning to examine how satisfaction is determined, we find that religiosity influences pay-satisfaction not only with regard to the actual wages, but in contrast with its negative impact on wages, being religious increases pay-satisfaction (see Table 7). The impact weakens when more variables are added, but it remains significant in all the equations (except equation 2). Having small children also acts here in contrast with the previous equation: Mothers of small children report greater pay-satisfaction than women who do not have small children. This may be due to their tendency to work fewer hours, in part-time jobs, having had greater difficulty obtaining this job, and they are therefore happier with whatever pay they get. Another contrast is found when gender ideology is examined. In contrast with H6, the stereo-

Table 7

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Satisfaction

	Equation 1				Equation 2				Equation 3				Equation 4				Equation 5			
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	B	Std. Error	Beta	t
Religiosity	.170	.047	.085	3.59[a]	.078	.050	.039	1.55	.107	.050	.053	2.15[b]	.113	.050	.056	2.25[b]	.126	.050	.062	2.52[a]
Children under 4					.102	.054	.051	1.89	.128	.055	.063	2.31	.124	.056	.061	2.23[b]	.120	.055	.059	2.17[b]
Num. of children					.065	.018	.103	3.59[a]	.049	.020	.077	2.43[a]	.051	.020	.081	2.55[a]	.046	.020	.073	2.31[b]
Marital status					.138	.068	.058	2.02[b]	.103	.068	.043	1.52	.109	.068	.046	1.60	.110	.067	.046	1.64
Education					-.005	.010	-.013	-.55	-.023	.010	-.059	-2.22[b]	-.024	.011	-.061	-2.30[b]	-.039	.011	-.098	-3.57[a]
Asian origin					-.040	.133	-.007	-.30	-.078	.131	-.014	-.60	-.078	.131	-.014	-.59	-.109	.131	-.019	-.83
Time in job									.001	.000	.047	1.57	.001	.000	.044	1.44	.000	.000	.005	.18
Seniority									-.002	.005	-.010	-.32	-.002	.005	-.011	-.35	-.001	.005	-.008	-.26
SES									.005	.001	.089	3.48[a]	.005	.001	.089	3.46[a]	.003	.001	.064	2.48[a]
Travel to work									-.005	.001	-.101	-4.40[a]	-.005	.001	-.100	-4.33[a]	-.005	.001	-.109	-4.75
Authority									.317	.056	.136	5.69[a]	.308	.056	.132	5.50[a]	.255	.057	.109	4.50[a]
Number of hours									.005	.002	.056	2.32[b]	.005	.002	.054	2.23[b]	.000	.002	.006	.22
Stereotypes													-.006	.003	-.040	-1.73	-.004	.003	-.030	-1.26
Wages																	.000	.000	.144	4.77[a]
(Constant)	-.083	.033		-2.37[b]	-.238	.143		-1.67	-.324	.166		-1.96[b]	-.149	.194		-.769	.027	.197		.14
Adjusted R^2	.007				.031				.072				.073				.084			
R	.085				.185				.280				.283				.303			
F	12.878				10.519				12.549				11.826				12.744			

[a] $p \leq .01$.
[b] $p \leq .05$.

types do not contribute significantly to the prediction of satisfaction in the regression equation.

The analyses of the structural equation model shows that as could be expected, wages is one of the major factors in the equation ($\beta = .173$), but most of the other variables in the equation contribute to the prediction of satisfaction as well. Strangely enough, all demographic characteristics are positively related (i.e., increase satisfaction), and most work-related characteristics are negatively related (i.e., decrease satisfaction). Thus, married women and mothers are more satisfied with their wages than single women who are not mothers. In contrast, the more highly educated women, with greater seniority, who travel longer to work, are *less* satisfied. This may be due to their having higher pay expectations than women who invested less in their work, so that their actual wages seem less satisfying.

Also, the impact of number of children is stronger than that of marital status ($\beta_{(children)} = .108$; $\beta_{(marital\ status)} = .048$), and may be taken as an indication that it is not so much the burden of married life that lowers pay expectations, but the responsibilities associated with raising children. Thus, mothers, and especially mothers of young children appreciate their wages more than other women, and are therefore more satisfied with them.[14]

In accord with H3, the analyses show that religiosity and gender ideology are positively related to satisfaction ($\beta_{(religiosity)} = .049$; $\beta_{(stereotypes)} = .098$; $\beta_{(beliefs)} = .191$). We should also note that these effects are partly direct influences on pay-satisfaction, and partly indirect ones. Moreover, the direct influence of beliefs on satisfaction is really stronger than the total effect shows, as the indirect effect weakens that influence ($\beta_{(beliefs\text{-}direct)} = .217$; $\beta_{(beliefs\text{-}indirect)} = -.026$).

Thus, religious women and supporters of the traditional division of labor tend to be more satisfied with their wages, though their wages are lower than those of secular and non-traditional women. The women who emphasize their domestic role seem to accept the notion that men are the major breadwinners, and to consider whatever they earn as "secondary" (or extra) income. For women with less traditional beliefs, especially those who are highly educated and have been working for many years, the existing wages are less satisfying.

Discussion

Women in Israel still earn less than men, and religious women earn less than secular women. The gap between them remains even when working

[14]Table of division of effects is available from author.

hours, education, and other human capital investments are taken into account. However, differences between the two groups of women run much deeper. Religious women support the traditional division of labor more strongly than secular women, and live by its' dictates: They tend to marry more than secular women, they have more children, and they tend to stay at home with their young children more than secular women, and for longer periods.

Because of this emphasis on family, their investments in work-related human capital are lower: Their average education is lower, they work fewer hours, more among them leave the labor market for longer periods to bear and raise children, and they prefer to work in women-friendly non-managerial jobs. They are also more willing to make compromises at work for their families than secular women. Hence, as hypothesized, religious women are at a double disadvantage. Still, in accord with previous studies in which perceptions and beliefs were included, the present studies show that religious women feel entitled to lower wages and they are more satisfied with their wages than secular women.

This "deprived but complacent" attitude (Crosby, 1982; Crosby & Ropp, 2002) may reflect these women's perceptions that they managed to escape the discrimination that most women encounter: They seem to attribute their lower wages to the fact that they invest less in their work as it is less important for them than their families: As can be seen from the model, religiosity is associated with the tendency to marry, with number of children, and with education. They also tend to support traditional gender ideologies more than secular women. This, in turn, is associated with lower labor market investments: "Traditional" women work fewer hours, accumulate less work experience, are in lower-status jobs, and fewer among them are in positions of authority.

Although religious women seem to be "punished" more than their inferior human capital would necessitate, their pay-satisfaction seems to indicate that they are either not aware of the bias, or they see it as justified, or else—they do not care. Their low wages are about half of what these women claim they need in order to support their families, but as they expect their spouses—the main breadwinners—to earn more than they earn themselves, this does not lead to feelings of relative deprivation (see Greenstein's (1986) similar conclusions for the U.S.).

According to expectation states theory, religiosity influences entitlement and satisfaction on an additional level: Religiosity in Israel may be considered a primary external status, symbolized by distinct codes of dress, not only beliefs and behaviors. Hence, religious women are physically discernible by both gender and religiosity, and employers know in a glance that a specific worker is religious just as easily as they know that that worker is a woman.

The initial status of religious women in the labor market is lower than that of secular women as they cannot (or will not?) see their work roles as taking precedence over their family roles. For them, full labor market commitment is not an option. As this preference derives from the long-standing traditional division of labor, they would expect others (e.g., employers, supervisors, coworkers) to be aware of their inclinations, and accept them. In this respect, at the societal level, the preferences of religious women contribute to the creation of lower expectations, which they then—as individuals—internalize as normative attitudes. As a result, religious women would *expect* the labor market to attribute lesser value to their work contribution, and expect to earn lower wages. Taking this conclusion a step further—though we cannot substantiate it in the current studies—it seems that there exists a greater compatibility between their existing wages and their expectations, which contributes to their greater satisfaction.

Whether they are aware of their lower wages or not, religious women apply different justice principles. Study 1 shows that more than three quarters of the secular women apply equity when evaluating how to define just wages (a similar proportion was found for men), but only about half of the religious women used equity. Instead, a quarter of them (but only 10% of the secular women) believe that needs should be the principle by which just wages are determined, and another quarter thought that equality within occupational categories should be the applied justice principle (but only 12% of the secular women thought so).

These findings increase the scope of expectation states theory beyond that of small groups, showing that its assumptions may be relevant to broader samples of representative populations, in which similar processes may be deduced. Although these studies were not designed in the format used by Ridgeway & Balkwell (1997), they provide support for the status construction theory they propose, and the theoretical simulations they performed, in which they show that "if macrostructural conditions show a correlation between an initially unevaluated nominal characteristic and a valued resource characteristic, the first will become evaluated, and group-based diffusion will aid significantly in making this status belief consensual in the society" (ibid, p. 28). In the present studies, religiosity, which is an unevaluated nominal characteristic is linked to wages, which is a valued resource characteristic. Consequently, both workers and employers "translate" religiosity into a consensual status belief (or even to a status characteristic), according to which religious women invest less in their work and value their work roles less than secular women. Reacting to status signals (e.g., code of dress) employers offer religious women lower wages, and assume that they will be satisfied with those wages.

Still, further research is necessary in order to examine alternative explanations for these findings. For example, religious women invest less in their jobs, they earn less, and are more satisfied with their wages because they have other rewards they value more and are willing to "pay" for). If they have a different order of priorities, they may consider working hours' flexibility or the ability to take days off when family considerations necessitate it, more important than earning higher wages (Baltes & Heydens-Gahir, 2003). If employers are aware of this prioritizing, they may be taking advantage of religious and tradition-oriented women and depress their wages even further (Kim, 2000). Research in other societies is necessary to analyze similar processes elsewhere to determine whether the same processes and interpretations hold up. In the U.S. and Europe, for example, the same may be occurring with traditionally dressed Muslim women.

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Appendix I

Correlation Matrix

		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Wages	1	.164[a]	.277[a]	.333[a]	.309[a]	.335[a]	.363[a]	.108[a]	.098[a]	.095[a]	.024	.343[a]	.347[a]	.242[a]	.037	.032	-.178[a]	-.051	-.031	-.005	-.155[a]
Satisfaction	2	1	.082[a]	.110[a]	.084[a]	.156[a]	.050[b]	-.108[a]	.138[a]	.163[a]	.120[a]	.106[a]	-.016	.127[a]	-.112[a]	.003	-.049[b]	.113[a]	.079	-.058	.085[a]
Seniority	3		1	.628[a]	.051[a]	.154[a]	.131[a]	-.031	.253[a]	.409[a]	-.082[a]	.138[a]	.091[a]	.790[a]	.070[a]	.132[a]	-.058[a]	.078[b]	.000	.019	-.055[a]
Time in current job	4			1	.024	.149[a]	.055[a]	-.022	.261[a]	.398[a]	.007	.142[a]	.030	.531[a]	-.094[a]	.096[a]	-.071[a]	.207[a]	.083[a]	-.006	.051[a]
SES	5				1	.141[a]	-.040[b]	.024	.070[a]	.010	.090[a]	.207[a]	.447[a]	.021	-.005	-.037[b]	-.061[a]	.017	.053	-.025	-.072[a]
Authority	6					1	.195[a]	.027	.056[a]	.049[b]	-.001	.141[a]	.127[a]	.124[a]	-.031	.007	-.129[a]	-.100[a]	-.050	.099[b]	-.092[a]
Number of hours	7						1	.081[a]	-.054[a]	-.126[a]	-.103[a]	.004	-.083[a]	.071[a]	.097[a]	.025	-.091[a]	-.079	-.084[b]	.060	-.154[a]
Travel to work	8							1	-.027	-.091[a]	-.008	-.001	.059[a]	-.038	.145[a]	-.013	.013	-.069	.058	.064	-.078[a]
Marital status	9								1	.523[a]	.431[a]	.154[a]	.050[a]	.339[a]	-.021	.019	.058[a]	.236[a]	.274[a]	.134[a]	.134[a]
Number of children	10									1	.379[a]	.204[a]	-.025	.540[a]	-.095[a]	.070[a]	.079[a]	.216[a]	.274[a]	.104[a]	.270[a]
Children under 4	11										1	.118[a]	.077[a]	-.103[a]	-.138[a]	-.063[a]	.022	.180[a]	.322[a]	.144[a]	.167[a]
Domestic help	12											1	.221[a]	.157[a]	-.056[a]	-.037[b]	-.047[a]	-.002	.043	.058	-.062[a]
Education	13												1	.072[a]	.111[a]	-.113[a]	-.094[a]	-.137[a]	-.026	-.036	-.203[a]
Age	14													1	.093[a]	.145[a]	.029	-.008	.025	-.051	-.055[a]
European origin	15														1	-.097[a]	.137[a]	.044	-.067	.081[a]	-.280[a]
Asian origin	16															1	.012	-.007	.017	-.013	.076[a]
Stereotypes	17																1	.511[a]	.179[a]	.051	.117[a]
Beliefs	18																	1	.177[a]	.003	.307[a]
High pay > interest	19																		1	.217[a]	.162[a]
Children > career	20																			1	-.037
Religiosity	21																				1

[a] $p \leq .01$.
[b] $p \leq .05$.